A September 2004 study of the Iraqi situation...

Interviews and polling show that Iraqis remain guardedly optimistic about further
progress in all five sectors. In some cases, the optimism appears unrealistic and
could dissipate rapidly.

· Security continues to be the predominant issue, hampering reconstruction
efforts on all other fronts. Crime is rampant, and, along with fears of
bombings, militias’ roadblocks, banditry on the highways, and regular
kidnappings, continues to impact Iraqis’ ability to go about their daily lives
with any semblance of normalcy. Iraqis are well disposed toward their own
security forces and clearly want them to play the leading role in bringing
stability to the country, but those forces are still not up to the task. Iraqis
have little confidence in U.S. and other international forces.

· Governance and Participation is a largely negative picture, despite a slight
boost in optimism related to the June 28 transfer of sovereignty. Iraqis are
knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the January elections but otherwise
remain starkly pessimistic about governance and participation issues. Most
are willing to give their government a chance, although they continue to
question its credibility. Corruption is rampant, and there are worrisome
trends in terms of protection of women’s and minority rights and religious
freedom. Kurds showed surprisingly negative results on governance; they
are frustrated with their own political parties and wary about protection of
Kurdish interests by a new Iraqi government. U.S. efforts have been overly
focused on national level politics and central government institutions. Efforts
to develop local and regional political bodies have not been adequately
backed up by the resources and technical assistance that would meaningfully
empower decentralized governance institutions.

· The continuing lack of Economic Opportunity and high levels of
unemployment impact reconstruction in other sectors, fueling security
problems and leading to entrenched frustration and anger at the occupying
forces. Iraq’s perceived wealth sustains Iraqis’ positive view of the future, but
security problems continue to undermine oil production and export.
Unemployment continues to overshadow the U.S.-driven macroeconomic
reform efforts and salary increases for Iraq’s civil servants. Iraqis currently
have a negative view of job availability, and those who choose to work for
foreign companies or in Iraq’s security forces face serious security risks.

· Iraqis remain unhappy with the level of Services they are receiving. The lack
of sufficient electricity in major cities continues to undermine public
confidence, fueling worrisome discontent in cities like Falluja and Mosul,
which were favored under Saddam and now receive considerably less power
than in prewar days. Sewage systems are worse than they were under Saddam,
causing spillover health and environmental problems. There is a wide gap
between the level of services actually being provided (at least, according to
U.S. government sources) and Iraqis’ perception that services are inadequate.

· Social Well-Being has seen significant improvement in terms of access to
education and health care, although there has been a downward trend in recent
months. There was an initial boost in the education sector with thousands of
schools rebuilt and children returning to school, but this has been countered
in recent months by Iraqi frustration at the lack of longer-term, sustainable
efforts in the education sector. There are signs that Iraqi children continue to
drop out of school at high rates in order to work and help supplement the
family income. The health care sector has suffered due to Iraq’s security
problems and inadequate basic services. Militias’ roadblocks and highway
banditry hinder access to and supplies for medical care, and the lack of a
functioning sewage system has led to an increase in water-borne diseases.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accelerate and enhance training, supplying, and
mentoring of Iraqi security institutions to fit
security threats.

Revise the U.S. assistance program to
increase direct Iraqi involvement and
ownership.

Reinvigorate the effort to expand
international engagement.

Prioritize Iraq’s justice system.

Acknowledge and address the deteriorating situation
in the north.

Decentralize governance efforts.

As the United States heads into its own elections in November, the pressure will only
grow to think about ways to define success in Iraq, perhaps as an attempt to define or
set parameters for a U.S. exit strategy. That is a dangerous course: Iraq will not be a
“success” for a long time. In fact, one thing this project highlights is the difficulty in
defining success at all. It is better to focus on catalyzing Iraq’s recovery by concentrating
on a set of measurable benchmarks, like those laid out in this report, and setting
Iraq on the right trajectory to meet those benchmarks. Setting our sights on realizable
benchmarks instead of on defining a U.S. exit strategy will be more beneficial for
Iraq, and suggest achievable goals for the United States. Iraqi optimism and patience
have somehow endured. They must be harnessed, because they could easily be fleeting,
particularly if the Iraqi government is no more successful than the CPA was in
righting the course in Iraq.

Our interviews suggested that Iraqis’ expectations for the reconstruction process are
grounded in realism, which accounts for their continued patience despite 17 months
of missteps in the reconstruction effort. After having survived decades of a corrupt,
dictatorial regime, multiple wars, and crippling sanctions, they did not expect much
from the successor government, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Iraqis
are judging U.S. actions and achievements in Iraq in contrast to those of Saddam
Hussein and in light of Iraq’s many desperate, unmet basic needs. But they are also
judging U.S. efforts in light of what our overwhelming wealth and power imply we
should be able to achieve. Therefore even if U.S. efforts succeed in making Iraq
“better” than it was pre-invasion, Iraqis may end up seriously disappointed.
At the same time, interviews and polling show that Iraqis remain guardedly optimistic
about further progress, in terms of security, governance, economic opportunity,
basic services, and social well-being. In some cases, that optimism appears unrealistic.
Many Iraqis we interviewed, for example, base their optimism about the economy
on the prospect of foreign investment; others clearly expect that government subsidies
will continue to ease their economic woes. Iraqi optimism on the security front
is largely driven by their faith in Iraq’s security institutions and the ability of an Iraqi
government to gain control of the country. If expectations are unmet, their optimism
and patience could dissipate rapidly.

The baldness of this second paragraph is underlined by what we saw in Najaf last month -- a situation where neither the US nor the Allawi government proved to be the deciding factor. I suspect it will only worsen.

Iraq: The Bungled Transition

Not sure how long that link is good for. Here's a telling paragraph:

The Bush administration's recruitment of staff for the CPA is one of the great scandals of the American occupation, although it has so far received little attention from the press. Republican political connections counted for far more than professional competence, relevant international experience, or knowledge of Iraq. In May, The Washington Post ran an account of three young people recruited for service in the CPA by e-mail, without interviews, security clearances, or relevant experience. They ended up responsible for spending Iraq's budget; because they knew little about the country or about financial procedures, they did so slowly. The failure to spend money was of course the source of enormous frustration to jobless Iraqis and undoubtedly produced recruits for the insurgency. According to the Post, the threesome, who included the daughter of a prominent conservative activist, had never applied to go to Iraq and could not figure out how they were selected. Finally they realized that the one thing they had in common was that they had applied for jobs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, which had kept their resumes on file.

The remaining international aid agencies in Iraq are considering pulling out of the country after the kidnapping of four humanitarian workers, including two Italian women, from their headquarters in Baghdad, it was claimed yesterday.
Jean-Dominique Bunel, a coordinator for the agencies, said the abduction on Tuesday had already prompted some aid workers to leave and others would follow by the end of the week. "We are reviewing the situation," he told Reuters.

Speaking to Agence France-Presse, he said: "It seems that most of the international non-governmental organisations are preparing to leave Iraq and some expatriate [staff] already left this morning.

"More will follow in coming days. The flights are full until Friday."

Thomas F. Hall, the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, acknowledged in a telephone interview last week that since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the nation's reserve components had been called in numbers unprecedented since perhaps World War II. But those part-timers sent to Iraq are trained and equipped to the same level as any active-duty troops, Mr. Hall said.

There will be a special place in hell for Mr. Hall, should hell exist.