Classic or Dud: "Why I Am Not A Christian" by Bertrand Russell

I say this as someone fairly anti-religion, too.

Well, I didn't want to have to write about the past 75 years of philosophy of religion. The arguments given by Russell are not his - they're fairly old refutations of old arguments: I don't think I have to refute 'Well, who made God then?' as there were formulastions of the first cause argument that are immune to this that predate Russell. He uses things to argue against Christianity which are not included in his opening definition of a Christian (belief in literal textual analysis of the Bible, for instance), and he makes claims that were dismissed in his time let alone now ("Historically, it is quite doubtful whether Christ ever existed at all").

But he admits that it's not a strong case - "if I were to attempt to deal with it in any adequate manner I should have to keep you here until Kingdom Come". It's not that I think the arguments for God are up to much - I don't - I just think his refutations are slight and partial. There are many, many arguments for God that get around these simple refutations, and other refutations that get them. Given that this was simply a lecture in which he spelled out the classical problems with proofs of God, I really don't see why I should have to bore myself and you with "tightly-argued refutations" that are fairly primitiva articles in the philosophy of religion.

Haha yes indeed.

Also, it is not really necessary or sufficient to refute an argument to say it is 'old fashioned', or 'old'. Strictly speaking, that is irrelevant. Lots of old things are good, and lots of new things are not good.

Sorry Kevin, I don't disagree, I'm just drunk and ornery. Also, I don't think all of those x-posts have read the essay. Anyway, I'm sure I'll feel soiled and guilty in the morning.

Bertie was crap on Nietzsche, too. But then he was a logician, wasn't he?

but I do that almost every evening really

Russell's points about how Christians don't practise what Christ preached still have a lot of resonance today. Turning the other cheek, judging not, and giving your property away to the poor are hardly high on the priorities of born again neo-cons like George Bush.

If someone believes that Christ is divine, then it is an (necessary) article of faith that he is the wisest and best of men, regardless of textual analysis. He is of course correct that Christ's teachings are not fully followed (Christ knew that they couldn't be) so I won't fault him on that. Like him I am constantly puzzled by Christian's insistance on supporting war and capitalism, but I don't think it has much relevance to any faith I might hold.

If you're advocating mystical or intuitive or 'direct' evidence of Christ's character, be aware that it's a very slippery slope and it leads to absurdities like Bush's 'faith-based intelligence' and 'Who would Jesus bomb?'

The title of his essay is "why I am not a Christian". The behaviour of people who profess to be Christians and/or the consequences of people striving to be Christian are bound to be an influence on whether people become Christian. From a philosophical perspective, hypocrisy by professed Christians does not prove Christianity wrong, but that doesn't prevent it from being one valid reason why one is not a Christian. In fact, since academic philosophy comes to no settled conclusion on the question of the existence of God, the behaviour of professed Christians will seem to many people a better indication of the rightness of Christianity than philosophical dispute. If Christians were demonstrably more moral than other people (as their beliefs suggest they should be, and as many profess to be) the case for becoming a Christian would certainly seem stronger to me.

If Christians were demonstrably more moral than other people (as their beliefs suggest they should be, and as many profess to be)

I know that many profess to be better than others (as do many atheists), but why do you think that Christians beliefs mean that they would be better than other people? I think this is wrong - Christ's position as the second Adam is an ideal of perfection to aspire to: but failure is inevitable. Christian beliefs hold that all humans are sinful, and all succumb to temptation. Christ himself doubts God on the cross. It's the forgivness of sin, not it's absence, that is vital to Christianity. Obviously one would hope, as Christ did, that people can try and succeed to be better, but there isn't anything in Christ's teachings to suggest that Christians are better people.

hypocrisy by professed Christians does not prove Christianity wrong, but that doesn't prevent it from being one valid reason why one is not a Christian

If your saying that in the complete absence of any other reason to chose to be or not to be a Christian, assuming your philosophical views on knowledge can't inform the choice, that this is a reason to choose one way or the other - fine. It's not a valid one, but without anything else it may help you make up your mind - but which way?

I don't think it is a valid reason not to be a Christian ...........The behaviour of others who accept these beliefs is irrelevant to whether or not you believe they are true.

Kevin you are missing my point. Obviously Christians being hypocritical does not disprove their religious beliefs. Nor, if they were a subgroup that was demonstrably less selfish than society at large, would that "prove" that their religious beliefs. But I think it would strike many people as evidence, even persuasive evidence, that their religion "worked" and make them more likely to adopt the faith (*).

I'm not sure why you want to dismiss this reason for faith as "invalid". Admittedly the evidence would be circumstantial, but it would still be more compelling than the necessarily contradictory evidence offered by centuries of philosophical speculation.

(*) Consider the possibility that no Jewish army had every lost a battle, even when heavily outnumbered. That would not prove the existence of God, nor that they were God's chosen people. But wouldn't it be evidence that people would find persuasive?

There are many religious sects whose morality is, in a conventional sense, admirable. Ascetics might give all of there possessions up to charity, comfort the sick, avoid harming insects etc., but this doesn't seem to have much effect on people's attraction to the faith. People on the whole accept faiths because they feel them to be true (either raised in the faith, or find that the faith matches their views), not because people are nicer. I'm saying the same sort of things as I did in my last post, so I have the feeling I am missing something - I don't believe that the 'goodness' of followers of a faith are any indications that it 'works' or it true (and I deny there is a difference between those two things with regards faith), and I don't beleive people generally act as if there were. People may find the 'sinfulness' of a group of people (I also don't think this really applies to any faith - the followers of one faith will tend to be as moral as the followers of another) puts them off an idea, but this is not rational, it is prejudice.

So, if I am still missing something, ans you're not getting frustrated with me, I would like to understand.

I disagree with this. Most of what Jesus actually says about behavior is social: how to show your faith in action, and how to treat other people. (random interruption, sorry. i'm following the rest of the discussion with interest.)

That just seems wrong to me, intuitively. I'd be interested in what that 'body of evidence' is. It seems to me that religion is something people turn to in times of strife, misery, poverty, duress, bereavement, illness, and when they're approaching death. In my own life, the time I thought of myself as a Christian (around 12 years old) is when I was at boarding school, and more miserable than at any other time. You could say that people with faith are happier than they'd be without faith, because faith is a comfort of some sort, but not that people with faith are happier than those without faith. I think as societies evolve and get more materially stable, people are happier and tend to get less religious.

The Guardian today runs an article about the attitudes of British 16 year olds. They're asked if they believe in God. Yes, 35%. No, 45%. Don't know, 20%. So atheists and agnostics are in the majority 65-35. I'd suggest this is because these kids are happy enough without Christianity.

So yeah, happiness, like the moral goodness of a faith, isn't a reason to believe that faith is true. Religion provides a comfort that raises people's wellbeing, but then so does marriage.

x-post Yeah, but he gets an extra few for being a pacifist and a socialist, so maybe it evens out.

Russell has at least some class about him. Proof of induction indeed! Behold the logican! Good shock value in 1930 I guess.

Peace!

Here's a news story about how Buddhists are apparently the happiest of the faiths:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3047291.stm

Here's quite a good essay about the phenomenon, with some bibliography.
http://www.ksharpe.com/Word/EP40.htm#_ednref52

A google for happiness and religion should turn up lots of sites that reference studies, though lots will be biased in one way or another, from evangelicals to anti-faith groups. (interestingly the sceptic sites don't deny that religious people are happier, just deny that this means anything about faith - they are right of course, but wrong in assuming this was what the studies meant.)

As I said, I think it's meaningless in terms of decided to become religious. To quote CS Lewis again:
"I didn't go into religion to make me happy. I always knew a bottle of Port would do that."

It is, of course, possible for religion to cause unhappiness; I think Catholicism's focus on guilt can be a harmful thing for some people, for example. As for Buddhism, it is not always so simple to say that is lacks a God, though this is mostly true. Some Mahayana Buddhisms have more mystical ideas about a unity to the 'nothingness' of the universe, and in places where Buddhism has absorbed folk religions you get deities like Avalokiteshevara who have many of the attributes of divinity, sometimes approaching the properties of the Judeo-Christian idea of God.

This nothingness of the Mahayanists of course should not be made into a somethingness. It's not considered to be a concept or an idea. Rather, it's simply the way reality is: empty, ever changing and spacious. It's not that there is nothing real. It is more that what is real has no fundament. It has no intrinsic essence or solid enduring being. If this understanding is granted the name 'God' (or whatever, call is Splong if you like), fair enough. However, what it is called, will soon debase that understanding and become conceptual, dogmatic, a religion: a set of fundamental beliefs. So I like Wittgenstein's saying: 'Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent'. True religion is silent, in this view: it has no propositions to teach. By this logic, of course, everything I have just said has missed the mark. You cannae win.

I've never been that into structured religious faith, so I probably agree with the idea that religion has no words - my faith is maybe two or three ideas, and the rest is an ignorant shrug. I used to go to church occasionally, I liked the communal prayer, and the music. But I have no problem with a faith that has a meticulous number of beliefs, it's just not something I can embrace.

If this is an example of "great and influential modern thinking" then Ill happily remain an ancient fool, must be my memes . His computer-person examples??????!!!!!!.

Im no intellectual giant obv but this is truly awful in the worst "virtue of selfishness" Rand kind of way. Back of breakfast cereal pack religious philosophy for the "me me" type for sure, prepare to shudder.

A review of Dawkins latest and greatest sums up a number of my own objections .

http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0408/articles/barr.htm

Peace!

-- the music mole (colinsbarrowREMOV...), November 28th, 2004.

otm

I was making a number of partially related points:

1. Russell being a philosopher does not mean that he need restrict his arguments for not being Christian to philosophical ones. The hypocrisy (or moral rectitude) of Christians may be a valid reason why one may decide to be (or not to be) Christian. This is a practical point: many people became Christians because of their perception that missionaries, saints and others led admirably unselfish lives.

2. Your appear to categorise arguments as valid or otherwise based on some concept of philosophical respectability. Yet, as you concede, probably by far the most important reason for people being Christians is that they were brought up in the faith. That is not a philosophically respectable reason. The number of people who converted as a result of reading Christian philosophers will be minute by comparison.

3. Moreover, there is a logical problem with privileging philosophical arguments as more "valid". First, no compelling philosophical case has been made for the existence (or non-existence) of God. Paradoxically, if one had, the question of the existence or non-existence of God would cease to be a philosophical question. If the case were "proved" either way, all reasonable persons who understood the argument would be forced to the same conclusion. It would cease to be a matter for philosophical dispute and become part of human knowledge, like the laws of physics.

4. In view of 3, philosophy cannot offer certainty, merely conflicting evidence. Which is why can't understand your basis for wanting to privilege philophically respectable arguments as "more valid": to look for the answer in philosophy is almost by definition self-defeating, since a preference for one case over another will lie not in the quality of the argument but in various contingencies including your cultural background, temperament and inclination.

5. I don't suggest that a demonstration that Christians were more moral than other people would "prove" anything, merely that it would be evidence of a sort.

Tangentially perhaps, I do think that philosophical arguments are the highest in some tree of knowledge - certainly more so than the 'laws of physics'. At any moment a new piece of evidence, the observation of a phenomenon contrary to these laws, could invalidate and change the laws of physics. Because of the logical nature of the claims, philosophical truths such as the Cogito (There are problems with the Cogito, but I think it is basically sound) there is no case in which it could be wrong (regardless of temperament or cultural background). Like mathematical and axiomatic truths, logical truths have a privileged place in my mind as the only knowledge possible. This, of course, doesn't get us very far, but I imagine Russell, as a logician, shares my belief that rational analysis is the purest kind of justification for knowledge.

Agreed new evidence could (and will) challenge (or probably more accurately refine) the laws of physics, but equally new developments in philosophy will result in positions currently thought of as intellectually respectable becoming less so. The difference is that there comes a point when *all* informed opinion accepted that the earth is round not flat, that the earth orbits the sun not vice-versa and so on because the known evidence guides every infomed, rational mind to the same conclusion. I don't believe this can happen in philosophy without the question at issue ceasing to become a question for philosophers (which is why questions such as "is material made of atoms" at some point ceased to become an issue for philosophy and became one for science; or indeed why "natural philosphy" itself effectively stopped being one of the subsections of philosophy).